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This paper develops a model of public exchange whereby voters and education policy 
makers exchange with one another within school districts. Because school district 
consolidation lowers alternatives to voters-parents , consolidation is hypothesized to 
raise public education spending because weakened intergovernmental competition 
allows policy makers to promote their own utility, rather than that of constituents. 
Models of public education spending and academic performance are estimated over 
1988 Ð 1990. While evidence indicates little support for the traditional treatment of the 
Leviathan hypothesis that greater competition lowers public spending, this paper 
argues that education spending by itself does not fully provide a valid test of the 
Leviathan hypothesis since spending, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the 
quality of public education programmes. Empirical evidence indicates that greater 
numbers of schools and school districts promote higher student achievement as 
evidenced by higher math and verbal SAT scores, math pro® ciency of 8th graders, and 
lower high school drop-out rates. Evidence therefore suggests that, while greater 
numbers of school districts and schools are, to some degree, associated with higher 
public education spending, higher student achievement appears to follow as well. 
I . INTRODUCTION United States. The ® rst arises because public schools pro­
vide 90% of primary and secondary education and therefore 
There is growing perception that the educational system of crowd-out private schools that otherwise might inject 
the United States is in decline and, because the public sector greater competition into the education market. Parents 
is the dominant supplier of education, criticism naturally must pay twice for education when they send children to 
focuses on the public school system. While it is often argued private schools since payments for public schools are not 
that spending has declined, public education spending voluntary. School choice policies are aimed at curtailing the 
(1989 Ð 90 dollars) per pupil rose 74% from 1960 to 1992, or public education monopoly because they provide public 
from roughly $2979 to $5196.1 Despite this spending in- funds for parents who choose private schools for their 
crease, combined SAT (Student Achievement Test) scores children.3 Until widespread support for such policies arises, 
fell 5.2%, or from 948 to 899 over this same period.2 the public education sector will likely remain insulated from 
Two structural characteristics describe the delivery of private competition. The second characteristic follows from 
primary and secondary levels of public education in the dramatic reduction in numbers of public school districts: 
1 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993, Tables 221 and 222. 
2 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993, Table 265. 
3 California’s Education Vouchers Initiative (Proposition 174), which was defeated in 1993, would have o� ered annual public vouchers of 
roughly $2600. Friedman (1962) was an early supporter of such policies. Couch, Shughart and Williams (1993) conclude that school 
vouchers would create a more competitive environment between private and public schools and therefore improve public school quality 
because higher competition for students is shown to foster higher educational quality, as measured by test scores of a standardized algebra 
test given to all public school students in North Carolina. When controlling for many factors, such as per capita spending on public school 
students, poverty, and educational attainment of parents, public school quality was determined to be positively related to competition, as 
measured by the percentage of school age children enrolled in private schools in neighbouring private schools. 
from 108 579 to 14 741 over 1942 Ð 1987. Although some of spending and academic performance will suggest how past
 
this consolidation may have been motivated by the argu- consolidation of school districts has in¯ uenced the public
 
ment that greater scale economies would result, public edu- education system.
 
cation is now characterized by fewer suppliers.
 
This paper addresses the second characteristic by devel­
oping a model of public exchange whereby voters and II . EXCHANGE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
education policy makers exchange with one another within MARKETS 
school districts. The in¯ uence of school district consolida­
tion is examined within the context of the Tiebout (1956) Public education policies arise from exchange between 
e� ect whereby voters search for desired public programmes voters and policy makers. Voters, or primarily parents in the 
within a system of many competing public suppliers. Be- case of education, signal preferences to policy makers 
cause consolidation lowers alternatives to voters-parents through voice and exit options.5 Voice options include 
and, following the Leviathan model of policy makers (Bren- voting and expressing views directly to policy makers. Exit 
nan and Buchanan, 1980) , consolidation is hypothesized to options are primarily in¯ uenced by ® scal structure and, 
raise public education spending because weakened inter- under a federalist structure, dissatis® ed parents may move 
govenmental competition allows policy makers to promote from one school district to another as they search for de­
their own utility, rather than that of constituents. As a point sired education policies.6 Exit options may be exercised 
of departure from earlier studies, this paper argues that, when parents conclude they cannot e� ectively in¯ uence 
while consolidation is predicted to raise spending, this result local educational policies through voice options. Exiting is 
does not necessarily coincide with the Leviathan model `voting-with-your feet’ in the model of voter behaviour 
because higher education spending does not necessarily developed by Charles Tiebout (1956). The Tiebout model 
imply lower quality programmes. Higher spending, by itself predicts that, because citizens search for desired packages of 
does not necessarily imply anything about programme government programmes, like-minded citizens tend to as­
quality. Higher spending could ® lter down to student learn- semble in the same political jurisdiction. One result of this 
ing and re¯ ect higher quality programmes. Of course, higher search process is that residents of local governments are 
spending could also simply re¯ ect higher amenities pro- fairly uniform in their preferences for public programmes.7 
vided to policy makers that may be unrelated to higher Families, for instance, may congregate in communities with 
quality education. This important distinction is not many good schools and playgrounds and senior citizens 
addressed in the current literature on school consolidation. may congregate where there are many adult education 
Examination of how numbers of schools in¯ uence spend- classes and stringent noise ordinances. Studies support this 
ing and academic performance is another point of departure conclusion when they ® nd that, when communities with 
taken in this paper. During this era of school district diverse populations have relatively few school districts, 
consolidation, numbers of schools have dropped as well: there tend to be greater numbers of private schools.8 In 
from 89024 in 1929 to 61407 in 1989.4 Previous studies have other words, when numbers of school districts do not ad­
implicitly assumed that all schools within a given school equately support the many tastes of diverse populations, 
district provide identical services to parents. This is unlikely private schools enjoy larger markets for their services. 
since, even when school districts mandate standardized edu- Two bene® cial consequences of parental mobility are likely 
cation policies across all of their schools, it is likely there is within a system of many competing school districts. First, 
some, or much, variety in the teachers, sta� , facilities, parents have many choices and, under certain conditions, 
surrounding neighbourhoods, and students that make up mobility leads to a Pareto-e� cient equilibrium whereby no 
the educational experience. Qualities of individual schools parent may leave their school district and, at the same time, 
may therefore vary widely within school districts and it is gain higher utility. Second, policy makers are more respon­
reasonable to test whether numbers of schools exert inde- sive to parental preferences when unhappy parents may eas­
pendent in¯ uences on spending and academic performance. ily relocate to competing districts and, in this way, jeopardize 
Models of state public education spending and academic funding bases of school districts that lose customers. 
performance are estimated over 1988 Ð 1990. Examination of School district consolidation is therefore hypothesized to 
how numbers of school districts and schools in¯ uence both lower exit options by limiting suppliers and, consistent with 
4 Tables 85, Digest of Education Statistics, 1993. Excluded from these ® gures are one-teacher schools which have declined from 149 282 to
 
630 over this same time period.
 
5 These options were introduced in Hirschman (1970).
 
6 A more detailed examination of the roles of voice and exit is presented in Marlow (1992).
 
7 Nelson (1990) examined the variations in local metropolitan governments in 1982 and found support for the hypothesis that larger
 
numbers of governments serve those areas characterized by greater di� erences among local voters.
 
8 See Martinez Ð Vazquez and Seaman (1985) and Hamilton and Macauley (1991).
 
the Leviathan model, lead to expanding budgets that re¯ ect 
narrow interests of policy makers, who may include 
teachers, union o� cials, and sta� . Further, higher spending 
re¯ ects higher salaries, shorter working hours, more gener­
ous pensions, and other forms of compensation that may 
bear no relation to the quality of public education. Sup­
porters of this view generally advocate school choice pol­
icies because local school o� cials are hypothesized to be 
less responsive to demands for higher quality education 
when there are fewer choices for parents. The Leviathan 
view is that credible threats of exit are the only e� ective 
means of improving programme quality. Because consolida­
tion lowers exit possibilities, this view predicts that policy 
makers may more easily raise budgets in pursuit of narrow 
self-interests. 
But, while greater consolidation limits exit options, the 
fact that higher spending may result does not necessarily 
imply that programme quality does not improve as well. 
A competing view is that improvements in educational 
quality require higher salaries, numbers of teachers and 
school buildings; i.e. public education quality and funding 
levels are synonymous. Supporters of this view are often 
critics of school vouchers, but, at the same time, subscribe to 
the predictions of the Tiebout model. Vouchers lower costs 
of exiting public school districts since parents are provided 
subsidies to send their children to private schools within 
their own communities. Vouchers make it cheaper to send 
children to competing suppliers Ð private schools Ð and 
parents no longer must move to another public school 
district when they exit their local public school system, as 
long as there are quality private schools in their local 
community. Critics of vouchers are fearful that mass exiting 
of students will leave public school districts with lower 
funding, and therefore to an erosion of public education 
quality. Moreover, since vouchers do not normally cover 
full tuition costs, poor parents are believed to be less able to 
a� ord private schools and therefore, as higher income par­
ents exit the public system, funding bases and quality will 
erode further. 
A related argument is often advocated by proponents of 
the current public school system: that school district con­
solidation exploits scale economies that provide cost sav­
ings to taxpayers. However, while there may be economies 
of scale in education, it is questionable that the sizable 
consolidation of school districts has been prompted entirely 
by attempts to lower costs. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) argue 
that attempts to exploit scale economies is only one of three 
factors that explain much of the decline in the number of US 
school districts over 1950 Ð 1980. The other two factors are 
growth of state aid, which lowered quality di� erences 
between districts, and the growing powers of teachers’ 
unions such as the National Education Association that 
used consolidation as a means of lowering costs of organiz­
ing their membership. This ® nding is consistent with casual 
observation showing that public education spending 
measures, such as spending per pupil, have risen over this 
era of rapid consolidation. The degree to which consolida­
tion may have led to greater scale economies is therefore 
open to question because it is likely that consolidation 
exerts other in¯ uences on public school spending. Kenny 
and Schmidt (1994) ® nd that numbers of school districts in 
states are always substantially greater than numbers that 
would be predicted based solely on attempts to gain greater 
scale economies. Therefore, economies of scale are only one 
possible factor that determines the relation between school 
consolidation and spending. 
The relationship between educational expenditure and 
educational quality may also have a close analogue in the 
regulation literature. The Averch and Johnson (1962) e� ect, 
for instance, arises when regulators reward ® rms that 
allocate resources toward capital and thus leads to over­
capitalization. Daugherty (1984) expands upon this idea by 
considering how regulation may encourage ® rms to be 
ine� cient due to the Averch and Johnson e� ect and various 
incentives to in¯ ate costs. In the case of education, higher 
spending may arise from over-capitalization or salaries in 
excess of productivity and, in such instances, the connection 
between higher spending and product quality becomes un­
clear. Another interesting possibility is that school adminis­
trators may be rewarded on the basis of spending-per-pupi l 
or teacher-pupil ratios. The point of this discussion is that 
the relationship between expenditure and quality is unclear 
without further information on the incentives facing school 
district administrators. 
I I I . ESTIMATION OF EDUCATION 
SPENDING EQUATIONS 
There has been substantial testing of the Leviathan hypoth­
esis that greater intergovernmental competition results in 
a smaller public sector, as usually evidenced by lower public 
spending. Empirical evidence is mixed and, in part, arises 
from di� erent testing methodologies.9 Oates (1985) , Forbes 
and Zampelli (1989) and Heil (1991) ® nd no support for the 
hypothesis. Support, full or partial, is found in Nelson (1986, 
1987) , Wallis and Oates (1988) , Zax (1989) and Raimondo 
(1989). With the exceptions of Oates (1985) and Heil (1991) , 
which examine cross-national data, these studies focus on 
state and local governments. Another group of studies, 
which include the federal government in their testing, report 
mixed results as well. Support is shown in Marlow (1988) , 
Grossman (1989), Joulfaian and Marlow (1990, 1991) and 
no support in Oates (1985) and Heil (1991). 
9 See Oates (1989) for a discussion of some of these di� erences. 
Several studies speci® cally examine how numbers of 
school districts in¯ uence public education spending of ele­
mentary and secondary schools. Burnell (1991) tests the 
hypothesis that greater centralization leads to higher expen­
ditures per pupil on a data set of 280 counties from the 1977 
Census of Governments. Her model holds constant the 
following factors: size of county, teacher salary, pupil Ð 
teacher ratio, property tax base, state education grants, 
median income, and percentage of students in local popula­
tions. Numbers of school districts exert positive and signi® ­
cant in¯ uences on per pupil education spending. No sup­
port is therefore found for the hypothesis that school district 
consolidation lowers intergovernmental competition and 
fosters higher public spending. This result may suggest that 
consolidation fosters scale economies that results in lower 
spending. 
Kenny and Schmidt (1994) report some evidence that 
fewer school districts exert signi® cant and positive in¯ uen­
ces on expenditures per pupil. It should be noted, however, 
that intergovernmental competition is measured di� erently 
than in Burnell (1991): a dummy variable takes a value of 
1 when the number of school districts per student in a state 
is less than the value at the twenty-® fth percentile, and 
0 otherwise. Another reason why this study may not sup­
port Burnell’s is that it uses the state as the unit of observa­
tion, rather than counties. 
This survey indicates that there is little consistent evid­
ence on the school consolidation issue. This paper argues 
that, while the Leviathan model predicts that consolidation 
raises spending, higher spending by itself does not necessar­
ily support the Leviathan model. In addition, the literature 
implicitly assumes that all schools within a given school 
district are equal in the eyes of parents. This is unlikely, even 
though school districts may attempt to standardize educa­
tion policies across all of their schools. Personalities and 
quali® cations of teachers, sta� , students, and day-to-day 
practices of individual schools are likely to vary widely 
within large school districts. It is therefore reasonable to test 
whether numbers of schools exert independent in¯ uences on 
spending and performance. These important issues are now 
examined in the following manner. First, the relationship 
between numbers of school districts (and schools) and 
spending is estimated so that our results may be compared 
with those previously reported. Second, the relationship 
between school districts (and number of schools) and stu­
dent performance is estimated to clarify what e� ect numbers 
of suppliers exert on programme quality. 
The following models of cross-state education spending 
are estimated for 1988, 1989 and 1990: 
EXPi = f (Y i, EDUC i, DENSITY i, STUDENT i , 
STATEi , FEDi , L IBERAL i , UNIONi , 
DISTRICTSi, or SCHOOL Si) (1) 
where 
EXPi = education spending per pupil or as a per­
centage of gross state product 
Y i = median income of the population 
EDUC i = percentage of population with high school 
degrees 
DENSITY i = percentage of population living in urban 
areas 
STUDENT i = student percentage of population 
STATEi = state share of education funding 
FEDi = federal share of education funding 
L IBERAL i = index of liberal tendencies of US Senators 
UNIONi = percentage of wage and salary public em­
ployees who are union members 
DISTRICTSi = number of school districts per 1000 stu­
dents 
SCHOOL Si = number of schools per 1000 students 
Two measures of education (elementary and secondary) 
spending are considered: per student and as a percentage of 
gross state product.1 0 Estimation for three di� erent periods, 
1987, 1988 and 1990, is based on ease of data availability.1 1 
Signi® cance of estimated coe� cients is based on two-
tailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Data for 
EXPi , STUDENT i, STATEi, FEDi , DISTRICTSi and 
SCHOOL Si are obtained from the Digest of Education Stat­
istics (1992, 1993). Data on Y i , EDUC i, DENSITY i, are 
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(various years). Sources for L IBERAL i and UNIONi are 
discussed below. 
The median voter theorem predicts that median voters 
control spending decisions and median income Y i is there­
fore hypothesized to be positively related to education 
spending. Previous studies argue that higher educated 
voters tend to vote for more education and therefore a posi­
tive coe� cient is hypothesized for EDUCi , average educa­
tion of the population. Population density DENSITY i 
measures the percentage of the population living in urban 
areas and, because production costs are commonly believed 
to be higher in urban areas, it is hypothesized to be posit­
ively related to education spending. The student percentage 
1 0 Following the above discussion regarding the nebulous connection between educational expenditure and school quality, education 
spending was disaggregated into two components: capital outlays as a percentage of total education spending and salaries of teachers as 
a percentage of total education spending. These data were obtained from the Digest of Education Statistics (1992, 1993). However, in 
separate estimations (using both OLS and SUR estimation), the measures of competition did not exert statistically signi® cant e� ects on 
these disaggregated measures of education spending and are therefore not shown here. 
1 1 Unfortunately, with such a short time span, and given so little variation in several of the regressors over this short span, a panel model, 
or time-series cross-section model, was not estimated. 
of the population STUDENT i controls for cross-state dif­
ferences in student populations and is hypothesized to exert 
positive in¯ uences on education spending since higher 
values may re¯ ect greater parental demands for education. 
The state share of education funding STATEi controls 
for the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesis that more 
centralized funding leads to the perception by taxpayers 
that local funding burdens are lower than under less central­
ized funding.1 2 That is, the lower the cost perceived by 
taxpayers, the greater the demand for public education. 
Moreover, if higher values of STATEi lead to greater spend­
ing equalization among schools and school districts, then 
there may also be fewer quality di� erences within a state’s 
public education system and therefore fewer potential gains 
that parents may experience by relocating to another school 
district or school. The federal share of education funding 
FEDi is hypothesized to exert similar in¯ uences on public 
education spending. 
L IBERAL i is an index of the voting tendencies of US 
Senators reported in the National Journal. The simple aver­
age of the 1986 scores for both Senators in each state is used. 
An index of 40, for example, means that a Senator is more 
liberal than 40% of the Senate on economic issues. This 
index controls for the possibility that states characterized by 
more liberal voters might have larger public education 
budgets as well. 
Union e� ects on education spending follow from studies 
demonstrating that, when unionized, public sector workers 
earn higher compensation than when public sector workers 
are not unionized. For example, ® re® ghters (Ashenfelter, 
1971; Ehrenberg, 1973 and Ichniowski, 1980) ; teachers 
(Gallagher, 1978), and police o� cers (Trejo, 1991) have 
been shown to bene® t from unionization in the public sec­
tor. Marlow and Orzechowski (1996) ® nd that greater pub­
lic employee unionization leads to higher overall public 
spending as well. The percentage of employed wage and 
salary public employees who are union members UNIONi 
measures the role that public employees play in decisions 
over education spending. An alternative measure, percent­
age of employed wage and salary workers who are covered 
by union contracts, was also considered but, because the 
results do not change, estimations using this alternative 
measure are not shown here. Data for 1986 provided in 
Curme, Hirsch andMacPherson (1990) are used since this is 
the latest available year for this data. While it would be 
preferable to directly measure union penetration of school 
employees, these data are not available at the level of the 
state for years examined in this study. 
As previously discussed, the Leviathan model predicts 
that fewer school districts lead to higher education spending 
because this re¯ ects less intergovernmental competition in 
the public education market. The hypothesized sign on 
DISTRICTSi, numbers of schools per 1000 students, is 
therefore negative. SCHOOL Si , numbers of schools per 
1000 students, is also separately considered because it is 
questionable that all schools within given school districts 
are identical. Greater numbers of SCHOOL Si are hypo­
thesized to lead to lower spending since this indicates 
greater competition in the public education market. 
Initially, OLS estimation was conducted, but given the 
relatively large number of regressors which appear to be 
insigni® cant, estimates which allow for correlation in the 
error term were generated. The SUR model of seemingly 
unrelated regressions was estimated and are shown in 
Tables 1 Ð 3.1 3 If the disturbances of the equations are corre­
lated, the SUR estimator is more e� cient since it takes 
the entire matrix of correlations of all equations into 
consideration. 
Table 1 reports SUR estimates of education spending per 
student equations for 1988, 1989, and 1990. Median income 
is found to exert the hypothesized positive in¯ uence on 
education spending in four of six equations. Education, 
urbanization (with one exception) , state funding, federal 
funding, and liberal variables are never statistically signi® ­
cant from zero. Student share of the population exerts 
a signi® cant and positive in¯ uence in three cases. The union 
variable exerts the hypothesized positive, and statistically 
signi® cant, in¯ uence in all cases. Numbers of school districts 
never exert signi® cant in¯ uences. However, numbers of 
schools always exert positive and statistically signi® cant 
in¯ uences on education spending and therefore provides 
evidence counter to the Leviathan model of public spending. 
Table 2 reports SUR estimates of education spending as 
percentages of GSP for 1988, 1989, and 1990. Median in­
come and education exert no signi® cant in¯ uences. State 
funding (with one exception) and union variables never 
exert signi® cant in¯ uences on education spending. Urbaniz­
ation exerts negative and signi® cant in¯ uences in all cases, 
and is counter to its hypothesized positive in¯ uence. Stu­
dent-shares of population exert expected positive in¯ uences 
on education spending. Negative and signi® cant in¯ uences 
(in all but one case) from federal shares of funding are 
contrary to expectations. Positive and signi® cant in¯ uences 
from the liberal character of states are as hypothesized. For 
1988 and 1989, both numbers of school districts and schools 
exhibit positive and signi® cant in¯ uences on education 
1 2 Winer (1983) and Logan (1986) have argued that higher values of grants lower ® nancing burdens, as perceived by taxpayers, and leads to 
higher overall government spending. 
1 3 In comparison to OLS estimation, SUR estimation led to the rejection of the null hypothesis in the case of the Union variable in Table 1. 
In Table 2, SUR estimation changed the previously signi® cant coe� cients on the Income variable to become insigni® cant in years 1989 
and 1990, and led to the statistical signi® cance of the School competition variable in 1990. In Table 3, SUR estimation changed the income 
variable from signi® cant in all but one case. 
Table 1. SUR estimations of public education spending equations (dependent variable: spending per pupil) 
1988 1989 1990 
Constant 439.96c 159.85 497.44c 209.25 5.85c 215.99 
1.34 0.49 1.41 0.63 1.53 0.56 
Income 0.001 0.004c 0.002c 0.001a 0.001 0.01b 
0.72 1.74 1.72 2.53 0.87 2.08 
Education - 2.16 - 3.15 - 2.78 - 3.77 - 3.07 - 3.45 
0.35 0.59 0.41 0.67 0.41 0.54 
Urban - 1.24 0.35 - 1.93 - 0.23 - 2.81c 0.63 
0.70 0.24 1.00 0.15 1.30 0.35 
Student 11.88c 11.15 11.86c 10.55 14.77c 13.35 
1.60 1.25 1.47 1.11 1.75 1.29 
State - 0.30 0.30 - 0.29 0.31 0.33 1.01 
0.34 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.86 
Federal - 2.62 - 4.23 - 2.49 - 4.60 - 6.09 - 7.60 
0.70 0.76 0.63 0.79 1.20 1.09 
L iberal 0.14 0.29 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.25 
0.16 0.38 0.12 0.39 0.11 0.27 
Union 5.45a 4.44a 5.87a 4.63a 6.48a 5.16a 
3.53 3.32 3.46 3.23 3.47 3.24 
Districts 18.29 12.67 11.46 
0.09 0.05 0.40 
Schools 54.83a 57.66a 59.34a 
3.53 3.56 3.23 
R2 0.31 0.45 0.16 0.36 0.31 0.32 
s.e.e. 141.07 126.6 141.1 136.4 170.2 151.9 
n 50 50 50 50 50 50 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c: signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
spending. While, in 1990, no signi® cant in¯ uence is found in 
the case of numbers of school districts, numbers of schools 
exert a positive and signi® cant in¯ uence. 
Estimation of student performance equations 
So far, some evidence of a positive relationship between 
public education spending and numbers of school districts 
and schools has been determined. Although the previous 
literature would have concluded that this evidence fails to 
support the Leviathan hypothesis of a negative relationship 
between public education spending and numbers of com­
petitors, this paper argues that such evidence does not 
necessarily reject the Leviathan hypothesis. The Leviathan 
hypothesis also suggests that greater intergovernmental 
competition, or school competition in this case, fosters high­
er quality education programmes. The connection between 
education spending and programme quality is therefore 
ambiguous. Higher education spending (via greater inter-
school competition) could simply re¯ ect higher compensa­
tion for school personnel or it could also re¯ ect higher 
quality programmes. 
To examine this issue, the following models of cross-state 
educational performance are estimated: 
PERFORMi = (Y i, EDUC i, DENSITY i , UNIONi, 
TAKEi, DISTRICTS i or SCHOOL Si ) 
(2) 
The dependent variable, PERFORMi , includes four meas­
ures of student performance: Student Achievement Test 
(SAT) scores for mathematical skills, SAT scores for verbal 
skills, pro® ciency in mathematics content areas for 8th 
graders in public school, and drop-out rates of high school 
students. All measures of PERFORMi are obtained from 
the Digest of Education Statistics (1992, 1993), except drop­
out rates, which are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States. Pro® ciency in mathematics content areas 
for 8th graders in public school and drop-out rates are only 
available for 1990. 
It should also be mentioned that an extensive literature 
exists which discusses interpretation of student performance 
measures. Studies, for instance, have analysed the in¯ uence 
of individual characteristics (Spector and Mazzeo, 1980; 
Table 2. SUR estimations of public education spending equations (dependent variable: education spending 
as percentage of GSP) 
1988 1989 1990 
Constant 2.10b 2.05b 2.52b 2.38b 3.56b 3.06a 
1.84 1.79 2.34 2.22 2.82 2.44 
± 6 ± 6 ± 8 ± 6 ± 6 ± 6Income - 4 3 10 - 7 3 10 - 2 3 10 - 2 3 10 - 6 3 10 4 3 10
0.43 0.72 0.002 0.81 0.59 0.35 
Education 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
1.14 0.72 0.79 0.45 0.35 0.31 
Urban - 0.01b - 0.01b - 0.01a - 0.01a - 0.02a - 0.02a 
2.08 1.94 2.82 2.65 3.11 2.85 
Student 0.08a 0.08b 0.09a 0.09a 0.08b 0.08b 
2.49 2.34 2.87 2.87 2.27 2.19 
State - 0.002 - 0.001 - 0.005c - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.002 
0.79 0.52 1.30 0.98 0.80 0.53 
Federal - 0.01 - 0.02c - 0.03c - 0.04c - 0.05b - 0.05b 
0.62 1.13 1.35 1.81 1.78 1.87 
L iberal 0.005b 0.01c 0.01a 0.01a 0.01b 0.01b 
2.24 2.64 2.46 2.81 2.15 2.30 
Union 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 
0.92 1.00 0.85 0.90 1.13 1.02 
District 0.15b 0.10c 0.04 
2.19 1.48 0.48 
Schools 0.19a 0.15a 0.10c 
3.42 2.86 1.62 
R2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.34 
s.e.e. 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.48 
n 50 50 50 50 50 50 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c: signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
Leppel, 1984; Park and Kerr, 1990), the impact of di� eren­
tial test presentation (Marso, 1970; Schmitt and Scheirer, 
1977; Gohmann and Spector, 1989), and student perception 
of pre-® nal assessed work (Mudambi, 1996) on perfor­
mance. These important caveats suggest that all compara­
tive measures of academic performance have shortcomings 
and also indicates a need to examine di� erent measures of 
performance in our empirical study. 
Median income and average education are expected to 
exert positive in¯ uences on test scores and negative in­
¯ uences on drop-out rates because higher-income and 
higher-educated populations are expected to demand higher 
educational achievement. Urbanization controls for the 
possibility that lower educational achievement arises in 
urban public schools and unionization controls for the 
possibility that it positively in¯ uences educational achieve­
ment. TAKEi controls for the percentage of high school 
students who, in their senior year, take the SAT test. It is 
expected that TAKEi is inversely related to test scores 
because, the higher are percentages of test-takers, the lower 
are average expected scores since larger test-taking pools 
suggest growing pools of lower-aptitude students. 
Numbers of school districts and schools are expected to 
positively in¯ uence test scores and negatively in¯ uence 
drop-out rates since these variables re¯ ect the degree of 
competition in the public education market. Eberts, 
Schwartz and Stone (1990) provide indirect evidence of this 
relationship when they conclude that, from a sample of 
elementary students in 287 schools, student achievement is 
inversely related to school size. They ® nd that schools with 
more than 800 students are much less e� ective in fostering 
mathematics achievement than schools with fewer than 200 
students. Greater numbers of schools may therefore lead to 
higher performance because they lower such factors as 
student Ð teacher ratios. 
Table 3 reports SUR estimations of student performance 
based on mathematical and verbal SAT test scores. Median 
income exerts hypothesized positive and signi® cant in¯ uen­
ces in only two of 12 regressions. Average education exerts no 
signi® cant in¯ uence. Urbanization only exerts a positive and 
signi® cant in¯ uence in two cases of the mathematical test 
scores. Unionization exerts positive and signi® cant in¯ uences 
on test scores. Percentages of students taking the SAT exert 
hypothesized negative in¯ uences and are highly statistically 
Table 3. SUR estimations of student performance (MATH SAT ) 
1988 1989 1990 
Constant 
Income 
Education 
Urban 
Union 
Take 
Districts 
Schools 
R2 
s.e.e. 
n 
496.16 a 
18.37 
0.0001 
0.52 
0.06 
0.09 
0.26c 
1.41 
0.36b 
2.28 
- 1.17a 
12.98 
9.96a 
4.18 
0.80 
14.33 
50 
498.67a 
17.59 
0.0001 
0.41 
- 0.02 
0.30 
0.13 
0.69 
0.45a 
2.76 
- 1.14a 
11.80 
5.39a 
2.76 
0.79 
14.69 
50 
479.59a 
17.34 
0.0004 c 
1.33 
0.41 
0.64 
0.30c 
1.61 
0.35b 
2.11 
- 1.25a 
13.95 
9.93a 
4.06 
0.81 
14.98 
50 
482.66a 
16.47 
0.0003 
1.07 
0.36 
0.54 
0.17 
0.89 
0.43a 
2.60 
- 1.22a 
12.48 
5.18a 
2.64 
0.79 
15.39 
50 
496.58a 
18.19 
0.0003 
1.06 
0.11 
0.17 
0.20 
1.09 
0.42a 
2.66 
- 1.31a 
14.79 
10.06a 
3.81 
0.82 
14.57 
50 
49 9 . 14 a 
16.85 
0.0003 
1.25 
0.08 
0.12 
0.05 
0.27 
0.50a 
3.03 
- 1.30a 
13.44 
4.25b 
2.19 
0.81 
15.91 
50 
SUR estimations of student performanc e (V ERBAL SAT ) 
Constant 476.81 a 469.78 a 476.59a 
16.08 15.57 16.81 
Income 7 3 10 ± 7 5 3 10 ± 5 0.0002 
0.24 0.18 0.73 
Education - 0.03 - 0.07 - 0.03 
0.04 0.11 0.05 
Urban - 0.07 - 0.07 - 0.11 
0.36 0.38 0.58 
Union 0.32b 0.33b 0.27b 
1.82 1.92 1.59 
Take - 1.02a - 0.98a - 1.08a 
10.39 9.55 11.72 
Districts 5.32b 5.45b 
2.06 2.20 
Schools 4.67b 
2.32 
R2 0.72 0.73 0.75 
s.e.e. 15.50 15.39 15.16 
n 50 50 50 
469.37a 
16.16 
0.0001 
0.45 
- 0.06 
0.09 
- 0.10 
0.55 
0.28b 
1.72 
- 1.03a 
10.58 
4.79b 
2.54 
0.76 
15.12 
50 
471.66a 
16.75 
0.0003 
1.08 
0.12 
0.19 
- 0.13 
0.69 
0.34b 
2.08 
- 1.16a 
12.75 
4.10c 
1.52 
0.78 
14.76 
50 
46 4 . 85 a 
15.85 
0.0003c 
1.39 
0.13 
0.19 
- 0.15 
0.77 
0.34b 
2.09 
- 1.15a 
11.96 
3.05c 
1.63 
0.78 
14.81 
50 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c: signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
signi® cant. Both numbers of school districts and schools 
exert positive and signi® cant in¯ uences on all test scores 
indicating substantial support for the Leviathan hypothesis. 
Table 4 reports OLS estimations of the 8th grade mathe­
matical pro® ciency test and high school drop-out rate 
equations for 1990.1 4 As hypothesized, median income and 
education exert the hypothesized and statistically signi® cant 
in¯ uences on the mathematical test scores and drop-out 
rates. Urbanization and unionization never exert signi® cant 
in¯ uences. Both numbers of school districts and schools 
exert statistically signi® cant in¯ uences in directions sup­
porting the Leviathan hypothesis. 
1 4 SUR estimation was not conducted because data for 1990 was only available for the performance measures. 
Table 4. OL S estimations of math proÞ ciency and drop-out rate 
Math pro® ciency Drop-out rate 
Constant 218.01 a 203.29a 21.82a 23.33 a 
13.50 12.78 5.32 5.97 
Income 0.001b 0.001b - 0.001 c - 0.001 c 
2.49 2.94 1.78 1.80 
Education 0.72b 0.66b - 0.21b - 0.19b 
2.21 2.16 2.38 2.27 
Urban - 0.02 0.02 0.004 0.003 
0.16 0.24 0.15 0.11 
Union 0.001 0.04 - 0.02 - 0.03 
0.01 0.47 0.79 1.42 
Districts 7.91a - 1.41a 
5.65 3.67 
Schools 6.42a - 1.16a 
6.29 4.56 
R2 0.56 0.61 0.42 0.49 
s.e.e. 5.93 5.60 1.81 1.71 
F 10.08 12.07 8.13 10.28 
n 50 50 50 50 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c: signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Previous tests of the Leviathan hypothesis have examined 
whether numbers of school districts exert negative in¯ uen­
ces on public education spending. This paper provides no 
support for this hypothesis. While no statistically signi® cant 
relationships are found for education spending per pupil, 
positive and signi® cant relationships are determined for 
regressions on education spending as percentages of GSP in 
1988 and 1989. Broad support is also found for a positive 
relationship between numbers of schools and education 
spending (per student and as a percentage of GSP). There­
fore, evidence indicates little support for the traditional 
treatment of the Leviathan hypothesis that greater competi­
tion lowers public spending. 
This paper argues, however, that education spending by 
itself does not fully provide a valid test of the Leviathan 
hypothesis since spending, by itself, does not necessarily 
indicate the quality of public education programmes. This 
paper extends the testing of the Leviathan hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between public education qual­
ity and numbers of school districts and schools. Empirical 
evidence indicates that greater numbers of schools and 
school districts promote higher student achievement as 
evidenced by higher math and verbal SAT scores, math 
pro® ciency of 8th graders, and lower high school drop-out 
rates. Evidence therefore suggests that, while greater num­
bers of school districts and schools are, to some degree, 
associated with higher public education spending, higher 
student achievement appears to follow as well. These results 
suggest support of the Leviathan hypothesis since greater 
interschool competition fosters higher quality public educa­
tion programmes. This evidence therefore also suggests that 
the growing monopolization of the public education market 
through school district consolidation has led to a deteriora­
tion of the quality of public schools. Examination of how 
vouchers may inject competition into the education market 
would appear to be a useful avenue for future research on 
what public policies may do to promote an improvement in 
the quality of the public education system. 
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